What really matters? The elusive quality of the material in feminist thought by Rahman, Momin & Witz, A.
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Rahman, Momin and Witz, A. (2003) What really matters? The elusive quality of the material in
feminist thought. Feminist Theory, 4 (3). pp. 243-261. ISSN 1464-7001
Strathprints is designed to allow users to access the research output of the University of Strathclyde.
Copyright c© and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors
and/or other copyright owners. You may not engage in further distribution of the material for any
profitmaking activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://
strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the content of this paper for research or study, educational, or
not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge.
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to Strathprints administrator:
mailto:strathprints@strath.ac.uk
http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/
 
 
 
Rahman, Momin and Witz, A (2003) What really matters? 
The elusive quality of the material in feminist thought. Feminist Theory, 
4 (3). pp. 243-261. ISSN 1464-7001 
 
  
http://eprints.cdlr.strath.ac.uk/1550/
  
This is an author-produced version of a paper published in Feminist Theory
 (ISSN: 1464-7001). This version has been 
peer-reviewed, but does not include the final publisher proof 
corrections, published layout, or pagination.   
  
Strathprints is designed to allow users to access the research 
output of the University of Strathclyde. Copyright © and Moral 
Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download 
and/or print one copy of any article(s) in Strathprints to facilitate 
their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not 
engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-
making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute 
the url (http://eprints.cdlr.strath.ac.uk) of the Strathprints website. 
 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to The 
Strathprints Administrator: eprints@cis.strath.ac.uk
 
What Really Matters?: the elusive quality of the material in feminist thought 
 
Abstract 
The concept of the material was the focus of much feminist work in the 1970s. It has always been a 
deeply contested one, even for feminists working within a broadly materialist paradigm of the social.  
Materialist feminists stretched the concept of the material beyond the narrowly economic in their 
attempts to develop a social ontology of gender and sexuality.  Nonetheless, the quality of the social 
asserted by an expanded sense of the material - its 'materiality' - remains ambiguous.  New 
terminologies of materiality and materialisation have been developed within post-structuralist feminist 
thought and the literature on embodiment.  The quality of 'materiality' is no longer asserted - as in 
materialist feminisms  - but is problematised through an implicit deferral of ontology in these more 
contemporary usages, forcing us to interrogate the limits of both materialist and post-structuralist 
forms of constructionism.  What really matters is how these newer terminologies of 'materiality' and 
'materialisation' induce us to develop a fuller social ontology of gender and sexuality; one that weaves 
together social, cultural, experiential and embodied practices. 
 
keywords:  material, materiality, materialisation, the social, ontology, gender, sexuality, effectivity. 
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 What Really Matters?: the elusive quality of the material in feminist thought 
 
Introduction 
In this paper we explore some of the ways in which the concept of the material has inflected feminist 
thought, and consider this term in relation to the newer terms of materiality and materialisation. Its 
debut performance in feminist thought was in the 1970s within a current of feminism that was both 
social constructionist (in the sense of relentlessly sociological) and materialist (although the sense of 
this is not quite as clear).  It is useful to describe this current of feminist thought as working within a 
broadly materialist paradigm of the social where the terms material, materialist, and materialism 
cluster together to signify a set of epistemological, theoretical and methodological commitments to the 
constitution of the social: ones that derive more or less loosely from Marxist historical materialism.  
This current of feminism was politically as well as academically engaged, developing its theoretical 
frameworks both through engagement in specific political campaigns (for example, wages for 
housework and equal pay for women) and through dialogue and debate with a range of liberationist 
and new left movements. 
 
Feminists working within this broadly materialist, social constructionist paradigm were concerned to, 
first, displace prevailing naturalist, essentialist paradigms of gender and sexuality and, second, replace 
them with explanations of gender/sexuality which demonstrated the social and structural bases of 
gendered inequalities.  However, whilst a broadly materialist paradigm contained a specific set of 
epistemological and methodological commitments in its elaboration of theoretical frameworks, it was 
also anchored in political commitments, the first stage of which was to displace naturalist explanations 
of gender/sexual inequalities.  As Stevi Jackson makes clear, politicizing sexuality required a rejection 
of essentialism:   
 
In making sexuality a political issue, feminists began to conceptualise it as changeable and 
hence challenged the prevailing assumption that sexual desires and practices were fixed by 
nature.  Viewing sexuality as socially constructed thus followed directly from politicising it 
(Jackson, 1999: 6).  
 
The development and elaboration of academic analyses therefore had an overriding political aim: to 
allow the interrogation of these formations as fundamentally social precisely because dominant 
essentialist accounts legitimised gender/sexual inequalities as ‘natural’ and thus inevitable and 
immutable. The point we want to  
 
draw out and pursue in this paper is that this key aim of politicisation can be understood as a focus on 
ontology.  Displacing essentialist explanations is precisely aimed at rejecting naturalised accounts of 
how and why we exist as gendered and sexualised beings.  Therefore, our re-tracing of the concept of 
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the material begins with an exploration of how the materialist feminist project has used this concept as 
a way of mapping out the beginnings of a social ontology of gender and sexuality.  
 
These attempts to develop a social ontology also stretched the concept of the material in order to 
capture those symbolic, experiential and processual aspects of the social which were traditionally 
under-theorised in historical materialism. We suggest, however, that there is a lack of clarity and 
consistency in contemporary materialist feminist thought when the concept of the material is invoked 
to describe practices and discourses other than structural and/or economic. Furthermore, we explore 
whether the lack of rigorous conceptualisation indicates a reluctance to confront the limits of a 
materialist constructionist framework in evoking those aspects of the gendered social which they are 
trying to apprehend. 
 
The key aim of eschewing essentialism continues in the current focus on embodiment  in feminist 
thought on gender and sexuality. Materialisation and materiality are the key concepts in these newer 
literatures. Here we argue that the significance of these newer terminologies of materiality and 
materialisation lies in the way in which these move us onto a radically uncertain terrain with respect to 
the ontological status of gender and sexuality.  This is, of course, the terrain of post-structuralism, 
which challenges the hierarchy of value in materialism by asserting the ability of discursive practices 
to form the objects of which they speak and, as such, represents a critique of materialism (Barrett, 
1992, 1999). There is an apparent antinomy between the concept of the material and the newer 
terminologies of materiality and materialisation, one which mirrors and/or echoes current antinomies 
within feminist social theory, such as those between the material and the cultural (Adkins and Lury, 
1996; Butler, 1998; Fraser, 1998), materialism and idealism (Butler, 1993; Fraser 1998), structuralism 
and post-structuralism (Jackson, 1999; Walby, 1994), structure and lived experience (Rahman, 2000), 
historicisation and deconstruction (Adkins, 2002a, 2002b forthcoming).  However, the common thread 
weaving through more traditional and contemporary feminist modes of theorizing gender and sexuality 
is the rejection of essentialism through the displacement of naturalist ontology with a social ontology 
of gender and sexuality.   
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Although we are aware that each has her own understanding and definition of the terms material, 
materiality and materialisation, depending on her theoretical location, our re-tracing of the ways in 
which we think these terms have been deployed is geared towards furthering the feminist project of 
securing the grounds for a social ontology of gender and sexuality.  Hence, we focus on the trajectory 
of the concept of the material specifically insofar as it has underscored the development of a broadly 
materialist feminist understanding of gender and sexuality (see also Jackson, 2000, 2001). We argue 
that the terms materiality and materialisation should induce this tradition to develop a more robust 
social ontology of gender and sexuality which remains astute to structural context but also embraces 
lived experience and ‘the sociality of matter’ (Clough 2000). After all, what really matters is how we 
conceptualise the social in such as way as to induce an adequate account of its workings in relation to 
the construction of gender and sexuality.  In conclusion, we suggest that for materialist feminism to 
realize the full potential of its fundamentally social constructionist project, there needs to be a 
recognition of both the limits of a constructionism grounded in materialism and the potential of a 
constructionism that deploys materiality as a more porous and flexible concept. 
 
The broadly materialist paradigm and its recent recuperation 
The broadly materialist paradigm, which invoked concepts of 'the material', 'materialist' and 
'materialism' as the cornerstone of its social ontology of gender and sexuality, made its debut in 
feminist thought in the 1970s, after which it got few curtain calls and found itself largely eclipsed by 
post-structuralist and post-modernist forms of feminist theory that owed more to philosophy, 
psychoanalysis and literary theory than to sociology and cognate disciplines in the social sciences.  
Looking back at the often tortuous and obfuscatory debates that marked the emergence of this broadly 
materialist paradigm in feminist thought, we are struck by how recent recuperations of the concept of 
the material in feminism are highly selective (see for example Butler 1998).  
 
To facilitate a more representative (albeit necessarily partial and sketchy) appreciation of the various 
ways in which feminists have worked within a broadly materialist paradigm, we offer a broad-brush 
distinction between feminist materialism and materialist feminism. Feminist materialism - dubbed 
'feminist historical materialism' by Pollert (1996) and often termed 'Marxist-Feminism' (Barrett, 1990) 
-  worked in various ways within the parameters of Marxist historical materialism as both a method 
and a theory of political economy.  Materialist feminism (Delphy,  
 
 
1984b; Jackson, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2001) or 'historical materialist feminism'  
(Cockburn, 1981)) worked with a Marxist materialist method but not necessarily a theory of political 
economy.  The broadly materialist paradigm, then, catches a number of strands of feminist thought that 
worked with a concept of the material but at varying degrees of distance from the dominant materialist 
paradigm of Marxism.   
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Even within this broadly materialist paradigm, the concept of the material was a deeply contested one, 
which, paradoxically, symbolised shared agendas at the same time as generating deep divisions, as 
materialist feminism emerged out of a fraught and critical engagement with Marxism.  We should 
note, though, that the recent recuperation of the term 'materialist feminism' in the USA (Hennessy, 
1993, 2000; Hennessy and Ingraham, 1997), whilst recognizing the necessarily critical engagement 
with historical materialism that characterised feminist work falling within this broadly materialist 
paradigm, nonetheless tends to collapse the currents of feminist materialism and materialist feminism 
into one another.  
 
Feminist materialists or Marxist-feminists located their analysis of women's oppression within a 
Marxist historical materialist framework (i.e. a ‘social reproduction’ problematic – see Marshall, 1994, 
for a critical review) whilst still according causal priority to the logic of capitalist production.   Barrett 
(1990: x) usefully unpicks the central propositions of Marxist feminism, clarifying the strictly limited 
use of the concept of the material within Marxist-feminism.  First, women's oppression is historically 
embedded in the social relations of capitalism and 'thus material in character' and second, the role of 
ideology in this historical process should not be underestimated.   Indeed, as Barrett (1990) observes in 
retrospect: 
 
Women's Oppression Today can be seen, from a staunchly materialist position, as an 
'ideologistic' text in the sense that, as Johanna Brenner and Maria Ramas have put it, 'gender 
ideology is Barrett's deus ex machina....' (Barrett, 1990: xvi). 
 
Yet, in our view, the key to Barrett's project, and the ground it shares with other broadly materialist 
projects of the period, is that, as she herself says ten years after writing it: 
 
The book is firmly locked in the 'social constructionist' mode of its time and is remorselessly 
sociological in its treatment of 'sex and gender'.  If you look for biology in the index you will 
find only 'biologism', and this is a symptomatic  
 
transposition.  One passage is eloquent in its insistence that biological difference is an 
insignificant basis for the social meaning of gender: "The pattern of gender relations in our 
society is overwhelmingly a social rather than a natural one ... (p.76)" (Barrett, 1990: xviv). 
 
What this signals (and goes on to problematise) is the central concern of remorselessly sociological 
constructionist feminists with producing social explanations of the specificity of women's social 
position, as distinct from reading this off from or reducing it to biology.  The concept of gender 
symbolised a shared social constructionist project that sought to move beyond what were perceived as 
the prevailing biologically reductionist explanations of the time.   
 
 5 
The broadly materialist paradigm, which framed much British, French and North American feminism 
– and feminist sociology in particular - was a loose current.  But two key texts from both sides of the 
Atlantic were influential in inducing a more critical engagement with Marxist materialism by a current 
best-termed 'materialist feminist' (Delphy, 1984b).  These were Christine Delphy's (1984) The Main 
Enemy and Heidi Hartmann's (1981) The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism.  What these 
texts shared in common was a desire to untie materialist feminist analyses from the coattails of 
Marxism.  Delphy quite audaciously (for the time) mobilised Marxist methodology and terminology to 
argue that 'patriarchy' was a 'mode of production' that centred on household production, the axis 
around which women as wives and men as husbands formed as classes locked in an exploitative 
relation.  Hartmann advocated a 'dual systems' approach that explicitly set out to argue that patriarchy 
was not a historical relic, superceded by capitalist social formations, but was alive and well.  Terms 
such as 'capitalist patriarchy' (Eisenstein, 1981) and 'patriarchal capitalism' (Hartmann, 1979, 1981) 
were used to signal a new materialist paradigm of gender analysis.   
 
The concept of patriarchy, then, provides a further key to understanding what a materialist feminist 
analyses purported to be and is thus vital in appreciating the way in which some academic feminists 
negotiated a path - one that was both analytical and political -  between the critical theory of Marxism 
and the radical theory of feminism.  The main aim of materialist feminists was to develop a materialist 
foundation for a theory of patriarchy or, for those who were less convinced by the term itself, male 
dominance (e.g. Cockburn, 1983, 1985; 1990; Delphy, 1984; Hartmann, 1979, 1981; Hartsock, 1987; 
Walby, 1986; 1990; Witz, 1992). These two  
 
aspects of the materialist feminist/socialist feminist project cannot in fact be disentangled if we are to 
properly reflect on the genealogy of the concept of the material in feminist sociology.   
 
For Hartmann (1979: 208) patriarchy was 'a social system with a material base' and patriarchal 
relations were systemic.  Patriarchy did not simply exist at the level of ideology (as in Mitchell, 1975) 
nor could it be reduced to biology and reproduction (as in Firestone, 1974).  The concept of the 
material in feminist sociology was deployed to shift attention away from the perceived overemphasis 
in radical feminism on biology and reproduction and re-locate the radical feminist concept of 
patriarchy within a materialist mode of historicisation.  Effectively much materialist feminist analyses 
ended up being 'all work and no play' for two reasons.  First, the argument that the meaning of the 
'economic', or  'productive', was not exhausted by the wage-labour relation in capitalist employment, 
but was an equally salient category for exploring gender relations sustained through a marriage, as 
distinct from an employment, contract within the household (Delphy, 1984; Walby, 1986, 1990).  
Second, that the material base of patriarchal social relations, which persisted within capitalism, was 
men's control over women's labour in both the household and the labour market -  'all the social 
structures that enable men to control women's labour' (Hartmann, 1981: 12).  The concept of the 
material was deployed to de-valorize childbearing, sexuality and ideology and valorize economic or 
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'productive' activities (meaning the work performed to sustain daily life, whether waged or unwaged) 
as the axis which sustained male dominance in industrial-capitalist society.  However, the meaning of 
the concept of the material also underwent a subtle shift as it was being deployed within a feminist 
sociological analytics.  We now move on to explore how feminists stretched the concept of the 
material to encompass more than the economic. 
  
Stretching the material 
Marxist-feminists were constantly to-ing and fro-ing between the ideological and the economic, 
invariably resorting to explanations of women’s oppression at the level of ideology rather than the 
economic.  Ironically, Marxist feminists theorised women's oppression within Marxist historical 
materialism without providing a materialist account of the production of gender and sexuality per se, 
and increasingly relied upon importing theorists such as Freud or Lacan to get the ideological to do for 
feminism the analytical work that the economic could not do. Michele Barrett (1990/1980) argued that 
the proper complement of the ideological was not the economic but the material. However, within the 
parameters of Marxist historical materialism, the material was treated as largely synonymous with the 
economic (Cockburn, 1990/1981). 
The move to stretch the concept of the material is best illustrated by Cynthia Cockburn's (1990/1981) 
pioneering conceptualisation of 'the material of male power'.   Cockburn, along with many other 
feminists at the time, argued for a turn away from the ideological towards the material but pushed it 
one step further by seeking to dislocate the concept of the material from its economistic moorings, 
arguing that 'there is more to the material than the economic' (1990: 86).  She stated her intention to 
'allow 'the economic' to retire into the background, not to deny its significance but to spotlight (...) 
other material instances of male power' (Cockburn, 1990: 86).  These material instances of male power 
are the ‘concrete practices’ through which women are disadvantaged.  The economic is just one of the 
material instances of male power; the socio-political and the physical are two further ones specified by 
Cockburn. 
 
This move to expand the meaning of the concept of the material beyond the economic was important 
and influential, and served to challenge the assumption that the material dimensions of women's 
oppression were synonymous with economic relations.  There have been, and continue to be, 
significant attempts to stretch the material in order to encompass those realms of the social which are 
missed by the narrowly economic.  However, this point has been overlooked in some recent post-
structuralist work, notably by Judith Butler (1998) in her counter-positioning of 'the material' and ‘the 
cultural’ in contemporary radical politics and theory.  In her debate with Fraser over the priority given 
to sexuality, gender and race, on the one hand, or class, on the other, in radical politics, Butler argues 
that situating the former cluster as new social movements which occupy the cultural end of the 
political spectrum serves to reinstate the traditional Marxist emphasis on the material as economic:  
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The charge that new social movements are 'merely cultural ', that a unified and progressive 
Marxism must return to a materialism based in an objective analysis of class, itself presumes 
that the distinction between material and cultural life is a stable one (Butler, 1998: 36).  
 
What is interesting here is Butler's contention that the distinction between the material and cultural is 
no longer a stable or viable one, precisely because this was also implicit in the work of those who 
sought to put the concept of the material to work for feminism, as demonstrated above. 
 
As Fraser suggests, Butler's characterisation of  her (Fraser's) approach misrepresents it as 'an 
orthodox Marxian economistic monism' - a form of economic determinism best understood as the 
crude base/superstructure model which institutes the  
 
distinction between the 'material' and the 'cultural'.  As we emphasise here, this distinction had been 
contested prior to the arrival of post-structuralism on the scene through a variety of attempts to move 
beyond reductionist renderings of the material simply as the economic. This selective recuperation by 
Butler facilitates her argument that the full realm of the social is under-theorised or under-apprehended 
within Marxist materialism and its feminist variations precisely because her reading reinstates a divide 
between the realms of the material and the cultural.  It therefore allows her to intimate not only that the 
inclusion of the cultural is necessary, but also that post-structuralist analyses have a privileged 
purchase on it because of their focus on the effectivity of the discursive (i.e. cultural) rather than the 
determinism of the material (i.e. the economic).  
 
However, as we made clear in our introduction, the development of broadly materialist feminisms was 
intimately linked to attempts to re-locate questions of sexuality and gender within the sphere of the 
social and thus political. 1  Sexuality in particular was seen as an issue exceeding the province of 
Marxism and hence 'materialist' analyses which, by definition, were political by virtue of their central 
analytical emphasis on exploitation.  Yet, materialist feminist work of the period argued that sexuality 
was amenable to materialist analysis.  Delphy asserted that 'Feminism, by imprinting the word 
oppression on the domain of sexuality, has annexed it to materialism' (Delphy, 1984: 217).   The 
concept of the social has also been central to a materialist feminist approach (see Delphy, 1984: 214-
215; Jackson, 2000, 2001) which attempts to pull realms of everyday life, such as the subjective, the 
affective and the sexual, within the domain of materialist analysis, rather than abdicating them to the 
                                                          
1In view of this ongoing counterposition between the 'material' and the 'cultural', it is salutary to turn 
the feminist clock back nearly 20 years to Jacqueline Rose's (1990) essay 'Femininity and its 
discontents', originally published in 1983, when the tensions in feminist thought were represented as 
between 'materialism' and 'idealism', rather than 'the material' and 'the cultural', and were played out in 
debates about the salience of psychoanalysis or Marxism for feminist analysis.   One of the reasons 
Rose discerned for feminists discarding psychoanalysis was their inclination towards forms of analysis 
that are 'more material in their substance and immediately political in their effects' (Rose, 1990: 227), 
engaging feminist analysis at 'the level of material life' or 'the materiality of being'(Rose, 1990: 229).  
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realms of psychoanalysis.  Hence, in the period when newer terminologies of 'sexuality' and 'gender' 
were emerging, invariably slip-sliding into one another, Delphy speaks of 'social men and social 
women' to underscore her critique of 'idealist' frameworks and her insistence that the social and social 
practice constitute the new analytical terrain of feminism.  Broadly materialist feminisms widened the 
scope of the conventional definition of the material as economic to encompass social relations and 
practices within the household (Delphy, 1984; Delphy  
 
and Leonard, 1992; Jackson, 1992; Walby, 1986, 1990) and expanded the concept of the material in a 
bid to capture a range of everyday and institutional practices that previously fell outwith the scope of 
conventional materialist analyses.   
 
Those working within a broadly materialist paradigm certainly made the political move of asserting 
that gender and sexuality are not simply within the realm of (relatively unimportant) cultural politics.  
But let us also make it clear that, whilst we do not concur with Butler's selective recuperation of the 
concept of the material, we think Butler is correct to contest the constructionism that the initial 
politicisation bequeathed.  What matters is whether there is a limit to which the fabric of the material 
can be stretched to encompass the full range of practices that constitute the gendered social given that 
the broadly materialist paradigm of feminist sociological analysis has bequeathed an impoverished or 
'hollowed out' concept of the social (Adkins and Lury, 1996) thus creating its own absences that are 
ripe for colonisation by post-structuralism - most significantly, that which comes be termed 'the 
cultural'. 
 
Where we do have accounts of materialist feminism's understanding of this issue, they are, we suggest, 
notable more for their opacity than their clarity precisely because, as we suggest above, the material is 
running out of the elasticity that materialist feminism demands of it: 
 
I define myself as a materialist feminist, in the sense that I see gender divisions (and indeed all 
social divisions and inequalities) as rooted in material social structures and embedded in 
everyday social practices.  Privileging the material in this way does not mean ignoring issues of 
culture, discourse or subjectivity (...) but it does entail keeping in mind the material social 
contexts in which cultural products and practices emerge, in which discourses are deployed and 
subjectivities are constituted (Jackson, 1999: 3). 
 
Are gender divisions co-constituted by material social structures (which they are rooted in) and 
everyday social practices (which they are embedded in)?  Or does the use of the term 'rooted' imply 
that gender divisions grow out of material social structures to become 'embedded' within everyday 
social practices?  Such horticultural metaphors obfuscate rather than illuminate the meaning of the 
material, privileging the material in the construction of the gendered social without specifying the 
precise quality of its 'materiality'.  Indeed, Jackson (2000) explicitly acknowledges that a materialist 
 9 
analysis per se cannot apprehend the full range of practices that constitute the gendered social and that 
'the time is ripe for a re-evaluation and development of ...  
 
micro-sociological perspectives', namely symbolic interactionism, narratives of self, and 
phenomenology.  In short, this conceptualisation of the material alone seems unable to do the work 
that materialist feminism needs to do in order to access the expansive terrain of the social ontology of 
gender and sexuality.  Whilst we are happy, therefore, to concur that social practices, 
discourses/frameworks of meaning, institutions and our interaction with all of these through time and 
space produce and reproduce social life, we cannot but wonder whether this perspective stretches the 
concept of the material to the limits of its elasticity.  Indeed, we wonder whether it continues to make 
sense to deploy such an expanded concept of the material to signify a distinctively sociological form of 
feminism (Jackson, 2000, 2001) because we already have a term which describes the hinterland of the 
material: the social.   
 
Although this form of materialist constructionism neither reduces sexuality/gender to the 'merely 
cultural', nor implies a thinly veiled structuralism of the economic, we think it remains difficult to 
discern how this conceptualisation of the material fills out the 'hollowed out' version of the social 
inherited from materialism (Adkins and Lury, 1996).  What is the quality of the social evoked by 
contemporary deployments of the concept of the material?  What is, precisely, the 'materiality' of the 
material?  In Jackson's work the material is asserted as the bedrock of a feminist sociological analysis 
of gender and sexuality and privileged over culture and subjectivity and everyday social life, but 
widened from the economic to include patriarchy, racism, colonialism and imperialism (Jackson, 
2001).  The material therefore can be understood as the broadly systemic structural, but not a 
simplistically determinist structural.  Rather, Jackson recognises the insights of micro-sociological 
perspectives - such as Dorothy Smith and George Herbert Mead - which posit that everyday meaning, 
interaction and practice actually constitute the lived experience of the gendered social.  Dorothy Smith 
(1988, 1999) has consistently argued for the importance of structural economic relations in 
contextualising action and experience whilst at the same time maintaining that we only apprehend such 
relations through a focus on everyday practices and experiences:  
 
Though bureaucracy, discourse and the exchange of money for commodities create social 
relations which transcend the local and particular, they are constituted, created and practised 
always within the local and particular (...)  social relations in this sense do not exist in an 
abstract formal space organised purely conceptually, but as determinate actual processes' 
(Smith, 1988: 108, 135).   
 
The social for  Smith is not simply the material as exclusively economic, but rather 'materialism' is 
used to conceptualise gendered structures and power relations, whilst phenomenology is deployed to 
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conceptualise  'the social' as a terrain of meaningful and reiterative enactment of social relations  - 
'doing'  the social as 'determinate actual processes'. 
 
Writers such as Jackson and Smith therefore mobilise perspectives other than a traditional 'materialism' 
to articulate and capture other senses in which there are meaningful practices and identifications not 
captured by the concept of the material per se, however expansively this is used.  Notwithstanding 
Jackson's recognition (2001) that such perspectives need further development to weave them into 
materialism, we wonder whether in such deployments the material is simply being substituted for the 
social since the quality of the 'materiality' being evoked seems to rely upon established sociological 
analytics  - inequalities as systemic, historicisation, cultural systems, and the constituting effect of 
everyday practices.  We can discern that the insistence on 'material'  life is an attempt to explain the 
social ontology of gender and sexuality in a more systemic (but not exclusively economistic) yet 
simultaneously praxiological manner than traditional historical materialism has hitherto allowed. Our 
concern is whether we can legitimately claim that the distinctive materiality of materialism has any 
residual conceptual integrity when relativist epistemological frameworks such as 
interactionism/phenomenology are annexed to complement the realist, determinist bias of materialism.   
 
Hennessy's (1993, 2000) bid to re-juvenate a distinctive materialist feminist perspective confronts 
precisely this question of what exactly constitutes the materialism of materialist feminism and makes a 
bold attempt to re-situate materialism within a post-Marxist problematic by disarticulating the ideas of, 
for example, Foucault and Laclau and Mouffe from their post-modern moorings and rearticulating 
these within a materialist feminist framework.2  However, whilst Hennessy is acutely aware that 'we 
need analyses of how structures of power function in concrete, local ways' because 'these particulars 
are important components of the complex historical realities that people live by’ (2000:9) her 
argument is resolutely premised on 'the materialist insight that the kernel of relations between those 
who produce surplus value and those who appropriate it  - the profit making relationships  
 
on which capitalism depends - has a determining force' (2000:15).   
 
Again, as with Jackson and Smith above, we see the recognition that materialist feminism's social 
construction needs to be attuned to lived experience and the ways in which that is a processual 
instantiation of structural social relations.  Indeed, drawing on the work of E.P. Thomson, Hennessy 
develops an analytical framework which posits class 'as a structured process rather than a structural 
position' [our italics] (2000:18). However, although Hennessy's post-Marxist materialist feminism 
recognises that a key problem of feminist social analytics is how the social is conceptualised, it 
                                                          
2Hennessy's work provides an account of sexual relationships in late capitalism, attempting to connect  
'late capitalism’s new economic, political and cultural structures' (2000:7) with the significance and 
experience of both sexuality and the current forms of identity politics organised around sexualities 
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nonetheless comes to resemble a club sandwich of the social, where post-modern conceptions of 
language and subjectivity are deployed to develop a theory of the 'materiality of discourse' that is 
sandwiched between a fairly conventional Marxist problematic of social totalities -  which explains 
social relations causally and incorporates a fairly conventional pre-materialist feminist understanding 
of the material as the economic -  and an understanding of lived experience, identities and 
subjectivities as 'affected by' capitalism  (2000:5) rather than how these elements constitutively effect 
social life.  Yet again, stretching the material to the limits of its epistemological elasticity provokes a 
reflex, which draws us back to either historical materialism or, in the work discussed above, to 
interactionist/phenomenological sociology. 
 
The materiality of these deployments of the material remains unable to break free of the binding 
determinism of historical materialism unless radically different epistemologies are deployed to access 
ontology. The US current of materialist feminism  reclaims ontological issues from cultural 
materialism (post-structuralism) by re-weaving them into a circuit within the conventional terrain of 
historical materialism - the economic sphere, the mode of production of political economy (Hennessy, 
1993, 2000; Hennessy and Ingraham, 1997) whilst European and other North American currents are 
more concerned, as Hennessy and Ingraham (1997: 10) recognise, to stretch the concept of the 
material to embrace putatively complementary perspectives which allows the systemic context of 
materialist relations without distilling gender to a simple reflex of the economic system.  It would 
seem that the concept of the material insofar as it is apprehended within a broadly materialist 
paradigm, is unable to do the work that it needs to do in order to access the expansive terrain of a 
social ontology of gender and sexuality.  And we wonder whether this is precisely because the scope 
of a feminist analytics, once so powerfully fuelled by its critical engagement with materialism, is now 
impeded by its attachment to a distinctive materialist epistemology of the social when it is trying to 
conceptualise a  
 
social ontology of gender and sexuality.  This attempt to evoke a materialist ontology - the 'materiality' 
of materialist feminism - prevents a more expansive feminist sociological theorisation of the social and 
precludes an opening up of feminist sociological analytics to new agendas that can potentially enrich a 
social ontology of gender and sexuality.  The ongoing debate over the concept of the material in 
feminism is now being conducted on a terrain traversed by new theoretical frameworks, which are 
largely responsible for the introduction of new conceptualisations of materiality and materialisation in 
feminist debate, which we now suggest, may provide a way of unpicking the knot in the material.  
 
Materiality and Materialisation 
Feminists working within the broadly post-structuralist Foucauldian paradigm in the area of 
embodiment have been largely responsible for prompting the emergence of newer notions of 
materiality and a focus on materialisation (associated most strongly with Judith Butler's1993 work, 
Bodies That Matter).  Whilst we do not deny that there are disjunctures and tensions between the 
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broadly post-structuralist Foucauldian and the broadly materialist, pre-Foucauldian paradigms, we will 
insist that this should not obscure a recognition that these terminological shifts are more complex and 
subtle than is suggested by a simple counter-positioning of, for example, the material and the cultural.  
These newer terms should be embraced as potentially useful sociological concepts rather than 
exclusively post-structuralist ones.  We argue that the newer terminologies of materiality and 
materialisation do not simply signal the displacement of the concept of the material by the cultural but 
can induce feminist constructionism to work with a sociologically more adequate reconceptualisation 
of the social as a more fully integrated realm of symbolic and material practices, as well as to remit 
other matters into the realm of the social - most notably body matters.  What really matters for us, then, 
is how we work towards a more comprehensive, social ontology of gender and sexuality and how 
these newer terminologies of materiality and materialisation help us to attain this goal. 
 
We associate the new terminologies of 'materiality' and 'materialisation' most strongly with the work of 
Judith Butler and so, after criticising her earlier, we attempt to show how other aspects of her work are 
potentially productive for materialist feminism.  Butler's scrutiny of materiality occurs in the context of 
her concern that the notion of gender performativity (1990) - designed to wrench feminist thought on 
gender away from the lingering, residual facticity of 'sex' or 'the body' -  inadvertently 'overrode' the 
matter of 'sex' or 'the body'.  Butler sets herself the task of confronting the haunting question of 
whether social constructionism inevitably and irretrievably  
 
effects a full dematerialisation of 'sex' or 'the body' as gender absorbs or displaces 'sex' (1993: 5).   It is 
vital to recognise that Butler's interrogation of the limits of constructionism in feminist thought 
encompasses its materialist, radical linguistic and Foucauldian variations.  It is also vital to appreciate 
that this interrogation is specifically geared towards finding ways for bodies to matter within the 
overall sex/gender problematic of feminist thought but without re-instating an essentialist ontology of 
substance.  In short, she is worrying away at the limits of constructionism per se, although she is 
particularly uncomfortable with her own discursive inclination to dissolve matter. Hence, Butler 
begins with the concept of material as physical but does not simply accept this philosophical 
inheritance: crucially, she stretches matter into concepts of materiality and materialisation to denote, 
respectively, the effect of fixity and the processual/symbolic emergence of matter.  Butler relies upon 
the term 'materialisation' to find a way for bodies to matter within such a post-structuralist revisioning: 
 
What I would propose in place of these conceptions of construction is a return to the notion of 
matter, not as site or surface, but as a process of materialization that stabilizes over time to 
produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter.  That matter is always 
materialized has, I think, to be thought in relation to the productive and, indeed, materializing 
effects of regulatory power in the Foucaultian sense.  Thus, the question is no longer, How is 
gender constituted as and through a certain interpretation of sex? (a question that leaves the 
'matter' of sex untheorized), but rather, Through what regulatory norms is sex itself 
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materialized?  And how is it that treating the materiality of sex as a given presupposes and 
consolidates the normative conditions of its own emergence? (Butler, 1993: 9-10). 
 
The term 'materiality' is deployed to signal the problematic of both physical matter, or corporeality in 
this case, and crucially, the meaning or significance of that matter. Butler insists that we must neither 
presume nor negate 'materiality', but 'unsettle' it by freeing it from its 'metaphysical lodgings' and think 
through the ways in which bodies (i.e. matter) are materialised, that is, can only ever 'come to matter'.  
Thus, she dislodges understandings of matter as substance and remoulds matter into materiality. 
Crucially, materiality is no longer thus a static substance but reworked to denote an apparent quality 
i.e. a temporally specific effect of the 'process of materialisation that stabilises over time' - a concept 
used to capture the apparent stability or fixity of complex on-going processes of discursive formations, 
identifications and reiterations.   
 
But what we think is crucial here is that Butler is deploying the term 'materiality' to insist on a 
recuperation of 'matter' in the face of constructionism of whatever variety, be it materialist, 
sociological, discursive, or radical linguistic.  In short, the term 'materiality' is used to call up a quality 
that nonetheless remains problematic at the very time as it is called up within any constructionist 
framework.   Butler (1993) admits materiality in order to momentarily retrieve the fleshiness of bodies, 
but supercedes this by the term 'materialisation' to then insist that bodies can only ever come to matter 
through discourse and culture.  Cultural materialism at its most specific, perhaps, and therefore the 
focus of strong criticism from a range of materialist feminists (Hennessy, 2000; Ingraham,1994; 
Jackson, 2000, 2001).  
 
There is a strong sense in Butler's work that this quality - materiality - is both annoyingly stubborn and 
illusory: it is admitted into her analysis, even though she immediately defaults to a notion of 
'materialization' which is used as an analytical device to give us a purchase on social processes and 
their  'materializing effects' (1993:5) - recognised as materiality. Put another way, Butler is keen to 
rotate the focus of social constructionist analysis away from any residual sense of a substantive, 
ontological foundation of gender and sexuality towards the very social processes that allow the 
emergence and apparent ontological stability of intelligible genders and sexualities.   Materiality is 
evoked within Butler's work precisely in order to problematise that very quality being evoked.  It is 
simultaneously a recognition that materiality exists but that it exists only insofar as it is a momentary 
apprehension of the ‘materialized effects’ of the discursive formation of gender. 
 
Thus, whilst one of the criticisms coming from materialist feminists is that post-structuralist 
deconstructions thwart 'any ability to offer systematic accounts of social life' (Butler, 1998) - through 
the apparent deferral of ontology as the patterned instantiation of social relations - we suggest that 
materiality as used above, is a fleeting recognition of ontology as systematic, precisely because it is 
deployed to describe the instantiation of (admittedly discursive) patterned (performatively reiterative) 
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materialising 'effects'.  Notwithstanding the debate about relative priority given to the material and 
cultural realms3, we argue that we can discern the materiality of Butler as similar terrain to that of 
materialist feminisms which have de-prioritised the economic, in that both perspectives converge on 
the problematic of a social ontology of gender and sexuality. 
 
The term materiality has also been deployed in a range of feminist recuperations of the body. Susan 
Bordo (1993, 1998) and Anne Witz (2000) both use it to recuperate a sense of the embodied practices 
of gendered and sexualised being that get lost for Bordo in cultural constructionism and for Witz in 
sociological constructionism.  Phillipa Rothfield (1996) similarly uses it, along with the existential 
phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, to hold onto a stronger sense of the corporeal as 'the material bases 
of our bodily selves ... that complex of matter that constitutes our sensuous, cultural, kinetic, and 
physical place in the world' (1997: 33).  Iris Marion Young (1994) picks up Sartre’s insistence that we 
never confront anything other than worked and socialised matter – materiality -  to explore how bodies 
of gender are never simply  inert, physical objects but are, in Sartrian terminology,  practico-inert 
objects, inscribed by and the product of past practices. She uses the term practical-material to capture 
the ways in which bodies of gender are constituted through vectors of action and meaning. Although 
Bordo (1998) struggles with how it is precisely that she wants to retain a sense of  'materiality', like 
Young she sees this as an important concept retaining a sense of  'practical, fleshly bodies' (Bordo, 
1998: 91).  Bordo is particularly concerned that poststructuralism displaces the materiality 
(corporeality) of the body with an overemphasis on 'cultural plasticity' and uses the term materiality to 
signal a refusal to accept the limits of constructionism in conceptualising (and ultimately dissolving) 
body matters. This emphasis on the 'practical' is useful whilst the term materiality is being used to 
signal the sociality of matter.  Moreover, a twin sense of the materiality of 'being' and practicality of 
'doing' bodies potentially links in well with the less embodied but similarly practical 'doing' of the 
gendered social -  that sense of 'materiality' as actual practices and actions - that is to be found lurking 
within the broadly materialist feminist sociology discussed above (c.f. Smith, 1988, 1999; Jackson, 
1999; Hennessy, 2000).    
 
The social constructionism being worked at here is not one that is limited by physical matter, but 
rather one that is able to incorporate body matters as an indivisible part of lived gendered experience 
and action.  Thus the scope of the social or the cultural evoked in this newer literature confronts the 
limits of constructionism, whether sociological or discursive, by sometimes admitting, sometimes 
asserting the body as a problematic yet inescapable component of a social ontology of gender and 
sexuality.  Crucially, there is a different sort of material on the agenda of feminism - the 'matter' of 
bodies - and it is one that feminist materialism has often avoided because of its preoccupation to 
render gender and sexuality as social issues rather than natural ones.  But the materiality of bodies is 
                                                          
3See in particular Michele Barrett's 'Words and Things' (1992, 1999) for an excellent teasing out of the 
tensions between materialist and post-structuralist epistemologies of the social. 
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not about their 'naturalness'.  Rather, it seems to us that there is an attempt to consider the social 
effectivity of the physical - materiality  
 
as embodiment, experienced and rendered meaningful within gendered and sexualised frameworks of 
meaning and action – or, as Clough puts it, the ‘sociality of matter’ (2000).   
 
What really matters? The elusive quality of materiality 
Do the divergent epistemological routes to the quality of materiality we have discerned above 
necessarily undermine attempts to utilise a post-materialist sense of the materiality in a relentlessly 
social ontology of gender and sexuality?  Whilst materialist feminisms attempt to deploy a sense of 
materiality in order both to counter the discursive constructionism of poststructuralism, particularly the 
valorization of texts and representation, and to assert the importance of everyday practices as more 
concrete, and indeed more consequential, than discourses (Hennessy 2000, Jackson, 1999, 2000, 2001; 
Smith, 1988, 1999), one can discern undertows in these current that drag us back to either the 
structural economic (Hennessy, 2000) or micro-sociological focuses on 'determinate actual processes' 
of everyday social practice (Smith 1988, Jackson 1999, 2001).  In other contemporary feminisms the 
term is being used with a quite different epistemological inheritance, either a somewhat uncertain 
realism to evoke 'matter', particularly the fleshliness of bodies (Bordo, 1998), or to completely 
relativise and defer ontology in post-structuralism (Butler, 1993).  
 
Do these differences really matter?  They matter enough to suggest that materialist feminism cannot 
simply assert the material as central to its constructionism but must respond to the twin limits of its 
own brand of materialist constructionism: matters arising out of the residual facticity of the body; and 
the post-structuralist insistence on the constitutive effect of meaning and representation.  We suggest 
that materialist feminisms may find a productive engagement with these challenges by foregoing the 
need to insist on social life as 'material' and recognising the implicit admission in the logic of this 
claim: the materialist concept of the material cannot stretch to cover the social.  The more recent 
conceptualisations of materiality and materialisation make a discernible attempt to expand our 
understanding of the social ontology of gender and sexuality: both in the sense that materialist 
feminism has been somewhat sanguine about the lingering 'foundational ontology' of gender and 
sexuality - how bodies come to matter (Hughes and Witz, 1997); and in the sense that the body exudes 
a 'materiality' that is more doggedly 'fleshly' than a either a materialist or post-structuralist reading 
permits (Bordo, 1993, 1998; Hughes & Witz, 1997; Rothfield, 1996; Turner, 1996; Witz, 2000). 
 
Notwithstanding their epistemological departure points, broadly materialist and broadly post-
structuralist paradigms are attempting to access the same ontological terrain - the construction of 
gendered and sexualised being and relations.  And, yes, they approach this terrain from different 
directions: one from a conventional, yet expanded, materialist-structuralist ontology of the social; one 
from a post-structuralist position that radically defers the ontological status of 'the material'.  
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Nonetheless, the deployments of materiality as a route to a social ontology of gender and sexuality do 
share a concern with effectivity: materiality as the 'effects' of discourse (Butler, 1993); materiality as 
the social context and configuration of discourse (Hennessy, 2000); materiality as the everyday 
effectivity of social process, practice and experience (Smith, 1988; Jackson 2001); and materiality as 
the practical effect of corporeality (Bordo, 1998).  If we can understand materiality as an attempt to 
conceptualise and interrogate elements of gendered and sexualised ontological intelligibility and 
process, then we can begin to understand it across a range of diverse work as an attempt to understand 
what precisely effects or materialises - in the sense of bringing into being -  gendered and sexualised 
sociality, embodiment and identity. Materialist feminisms need to worry away at their rendering of 
‘materiality’ as ‘practices’ of the social which breathe life and meaning into gendered and sexualised 
being and relations, rather than simply to assert ‘the material’ as specific sorts of practices (whether 
economic, systemic, structural) which are accorded causal priority in shaping gender relations. 
 
The quality that materiality allegedly evokes is nonetheless still elusive.  Post-structuralism may have a 
more confident notion of materiality as effected through discourses, but even in this case we need 
elaboration of the context and configurative power of differences in discourses - why are some texts 
and representations more effective than others.  However, as an answer to this question we suggest that 
it does not profit contemporary materialist feminist analysis to insist on a prioritisation of 'the material', 
since this defaults either into a way of asserting the causal priority of 'structures' - be these of 
patriarchy, gender (Jackson, 2000, 2001) or capitalism (Hennessy, 1993, 2000) - or a vacuous 
substitution of the material for the social.  Rather, we suggest that we abandon a prioritisation of a 
materialist ontology of the social per se, because it seems to us that it is only this move which will 
permit the more astute development of a social ontology of gender and sexuality.  The move away 
from structural determinism that characterised so much feminist materialist and materialist feminist 
work, particularly within sociology, leads towards a conceptualisation of 'practices' as constitutive of 
the social in the most expansive sense of the word.   A praxiological account of gender and sexuality 
recognises how  
 
practices are both constrained by structures and generative of gendered and sexualized agency (see 
McNay, 2000), whilst permitting the use of sensitising concepts such as, for example, the social and 
the discursive to designate different sorts of practices, as well as the material and the symbolic to 
designate different sorts of resources (Fraser, 1997, 1998).  Above all, the ‘material’ can no longer be 
simply stretched within a broadly materialist paradigm of the social but what is required - rather than a 
simple elasticity - is a shift to a more porous rendering of materiality which is permeable to the more 
fluid understandings of ontology which have emerged from current challenges to materialism. 
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